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Abstract 
Alberta remains the only Canadian province to exclude agricultural 
workers from the ambit of its occupational health and safety laws. 
Consequently, farm workers have no right to know about workplace 
safety hazards and no right to refuse unsafe work, thereby increasing 
their risk of a workplace injury. This study uses qualitative content 
analysis to identify three narratives used by government members of the 
legislative assembly between 2000 and 2010 to justify the continued 
exclusion of agricultural workers from basic health and safety rights. 
These narratives are: (1) education is better than regulation, (2) farms 
cannot be regulated, and (3) farmers don’t want and can’t afford 
regulation. Analysis of these narratives reveals them to be largely invalid, 
raising the question of why government members rely upon these 
narratives. The electoral rewards associated with maintaining this 
exclusion may comprise part of the explanation. 
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Introduction 
 
Alberta is the only Canadian province that continues to exclude agricultural 
workers from the ambit of its occupational health and safety legislation. This exclusion 
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deprives farm workers of safety rights that all other workers take for granted—such as the 
right to know about hazards and the right to refuse unsafe work—and thereby increases 
their risk of injury. Criticism of this exclusion mounted during the period 2000 to 2010, 
with the honorable Mr. Justice Peter Barley highlighting the lack of a clear rationale for 
this exclusion during a 2008 public fatality inquiry into the death of farm worker Kevan 
Chandler (Alberta 2008a). 
This study uses qualitative content analysis to identify how Alberta politicians 
have justified this exclusion. Review of legislative debates identifies three rationales (or 
‘narratives’) used by government members of Alberta’s legislative assembly to justify the 
continuation of this exclusion. Analysis of these narratives reveals them to be largely 
invalid. Rather, these narratives appear to serve as rhetorical devices to sustain an 
electorally advantageous arrangement between rural Albertans and the government as 
well as legitimate morally questionable behaviour by employers. 
 
Background 
 
Most Canadian agricultural workers are covered by occupational health and safety 
laws (Commission of Labour Cooperation n.d). Such coverage provides workers in one of 
Canada’s most hazardous industries with important safety rights, such as the right to 
know about the hazards associated with their work. It also gives farm workers the right to 
refuse unsafe work without fear of job loss. And it empowers the state to monitor 
occupational hazards and prevent injuries through enforcement activity. This legislative 
protection has come relatively recently, with British Columbia extending OHS 
protections to farm workers in 2004, Ontario in 2006 and Prince Edward Island in 2007 
(Fairey et al. 2011; Ontario 2011; Prince Edward Island 2007). Elsewhere, Australia and 
the US include farms within the ambit of OHS legislation, but US standards do not apply 
to family members and also cannot enforce standards on farms with fewer than 11 
employees. In this way, US farm safety regulations apply to only about 10% farms, which 
employ about half of hired farm workers  (Temperley and Fragar 2010; Runyan 2001). 
 Alberta remains the only province that excludes most agricultural operations from 
the ambit of its Occupational Health and Safety Act (Alberta 2001a). This exclusion affects 
workers directly or indirectly involved in the production of crops through the cultivation 
of land, the raising and maintenance of animals and birds, and the keeping of bees. 
Workers involved the processing of food or other products as well as workers in 
greenhouses, mushroom farms, nurseries, sod farms, landscaping operations and 
operation involving the raising and board of pets are subject to the Act. Alberta also 
excludes farm and ranch workers from many statutory rights under its Employment 
Standard Code and Labour Relations Code. Workers’ compensation coverage is not 
mandatory for farm workers (Barnetson 2009). 
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Alberta has a long history of excluding resident and migrant farm workers from 
protective legislation. At the beginning of the 20th century, farmers lobbied for the 
exclusion of farm workers from workers’ compensation on the basis of cost  as well as for 
wage ceilings (Thompson 1978). Farm workers were excluded from the ambit of Alberta’s 
1917 Factory Act and the 1922 Minimum Wage Board Act (Leadbeater 1984). Farmers 
also colluded with one another and with provincial labour offices to set wages 
(Thompson, 1978). During the 1920s, the United Farmers of Alberta avoided legislation 
and policy that entailed cost increases for farmers (Leadbeater 1984). In this way, Alberta 
broadly mirrors the pattern found in Ontario by Tucker (2006, 2012). Danysk (1995) 
notes that provincial and federal government also made significant efforts to disrupt 
union organization. In the lead-up to and after the Second World War, with the Social 
Credit government excluding farm workers from legislation addressing male minimum 
wages, hours of work, collective bargaining rights and wage security acts (Caragata 1979; 
Finkel 2012), with this pattern of legislative exclusion continuing after the Progressive 
Conservative party formed government. 
A lack of access to statutory protections is one characteristic of precarious work. 
Precarious workers experience heightened labour insecurity “…characterized by limited 
social benefits and statutory entitlements, job insecurity, low wages and high risks of ill 
health” (Vosko 2006, 4). Broadly speaking, agricultural workers in Alberta exhibit these 
features (Barnetson 2009). Further, work precarity may limit the willingness of workers to 
exercise their workplace rights (Bernstein, Lippel, Tucker and Vosko 2006). Despite the 
demonstrable ineffectiveness of complaint-driven enforcement schemes (Weil and Pyles 
2005; Barnetson 2010, 2012a), Alberta continues to rely on this approach which suggests 
that the exclusion of farm workers from OHS legislations is not the only barrier facing 
farm workers who wish to exercise safety rights.  
This post-war legislative exceptionalism around farm workers reflects Canada’s 
preference of “cheap food” and policies designed to support that outcome (Skogstad 
2007). These policies include efforts to supply cheap labour, such as the historical 
progression of interned citizens, prisoners of war, refugees, coerced aboriginal labourers 
and, eventually, migrant foreign workers in southern Alberta’s sugar beet fields (Laliberte 
2006). Waged agricultural workers comprise one (albeit heterogeneous) element of the 
structure of Canadian agriculture. John Shields (1992) asserts this structure has three 
distinct tiers: agribusiness (i.e., the suppliers of machinery and chemicals, and purchasers 
of products) on the top, waged agricultural workers on the bottom, and farmers in the 
middle. Within this structure, individual producers compete among themselves as they 
purchase supplies and sell commodities to quasi-monopolies that set prices and limit 
farmers’ market power. In this dynamic, farmers seek (and are compelled) to minimize 
labour costs to manage the cost-price squeeze created by capital determining input and 
product prices. In permitting and facilitating this arrangement, the state subsidizes the 
capital accumulation process by transferring part of the cost of social reproduction (i.e., 
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food) to agricultural workers via low wages and workplace injury (Basran and Hay 1988; 
Skogstad 1979, 1987, 2007; Kelly 1982). 
Since 2000, Alberta’s OHS exclusion has been the subject of increasing criticism 
from farm worker advocates and opposition parties (Alberta Federation of Labour 2005, 
2008, 2009, 2011; United Food and Commercial Workers 2010). Criticism of the 
exclusion dramatically escalated following the death of feedlot worker Kevan Chandler in 
2006 and the release of the 2008 public fatality inquiry report into Chandler’s death. In 
this report, Judge Peter Barley recommended “…paid employees on farms should be 
covered by the Occupational Health and Safety Act, R.S.A. 2000 Ch. 0-2., with the same 
exemption for family members and other non-paid workers that apply to non-farm 
employers” (Alberta 2008a, 7). Barley also noted “No logical explanation was given as to 
why paid employees on a farm are not covered by the same workplace legislation as non-
farm employees” (Alberta 2008a, 6). This criticism occurred in the context of increasing 
in legal, academic and union attention to the position of agricultural workers Canada, 
including the growing use of migrant and immigrant labour, the inability of these 
workers to unionize, and the health and safety of these workers (Faraday, Fudge and 
Tucker 2012; United Food and Commercial Workers 2011; Otero and Preibisch 2010; 
Basok 2002). 
Concern about the health and safety of farm workers reflects the hazardous nature 
of farm work. The agriculture industry records among the highest fatality rates of any 
Canadian occupation (Picket et al. 1999). Data on non-fatal injuries is elusive, but 
American data suggests farm workers have the highest incidence of workplace fatalities 
and higher rates of many occupational diseases and injuries (Hovey and Magana 2002; 
Sakala 1987). These injury rates reflect well known agricultural dangers, such as exposure 
to hazardous chemical and biological agents, long working days, physically demanding 
and repetitive tasks, hazardous equipment and livestock, unsafe transportation, 
inadequate housing and sanitation, and working alone (Hennerbry 2010; Otero and 
Preibisch 2010; Anthony, Williams and Avery 2008; Arcury and Quandt 2007, Hansen 
and Donahue 2003; Arcury et al. 2001). Exacerbating these hazards are a lack of training 
and education and the absence (or non-use) of personal protective equipment (Verduzco 
and Lozano 2003; Quandt et al. 2006; Moore 2004). 
During the period 2000-2010, Alberta’s political scene was stable. The Progressive 
Conservative party formed majority governments 12 consecutive times between 1971 and 
2012. The opposition was fragmented and had been largely urban-based and centre-left 
leaning. Rural constituencies usually elect conservative Members of the Legislative 
Assembly (MLAs) (Alberta 1997, 2001b, 2004, 2008b). Consequently, the real political 
contest in Alberta often occurs within PC Party leadership races, as varying shades of 
conservativism compete for support. At the end of this period, the new Wildrose Party 
created a far-right opposition party with rural support, particularly in southern Alberta. 
The 2012 election saw a potentially significant re-alignment, with rural southern Alberta 
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electing Wildrose MLAs and urbanites throwing their support behind the relatively 
progressive Conservative Party. This change may reduce power of rural Albertans, 
including the farm lobby. 
 
Method 
 
This study examines the rationale used by Alberta government MLAs to justify the 
continued exclusion of most agricultural workers from the ambit of Alberta’s 
Occupational Health and Safety Act as well as the validity of this rationale. The research 
questions are: 
 
1. How have government MLAs justified the continued exclusion of most 
agricultural workers from the ambit of OHS legislation? 
2. Does this justification hold up to close scrutiny? 
  
In answering the first question, this study uses qualitative content analysis to 
identify the various ‘narratives’ that comprise the justification of farm workers’ regulatory 
exclusion. Qualitative content analysis focuses on the content and contextual meaning of 
textual material in order to classify large quantities of text into manageable categories and 
thereby reveal underlying patterns or themes of a phenomenon (Hsieh and Shannon 
2005; Kohlbacher 2006; Krippendorff 2004; Kondracki and Wellman 2002; Morse and 
Fiel, 1995). The second question is examined through analysis of each narrative with 
reference to the literature on farm safety and regulation. 
The data for this study comprises all statements recorded in transcripts of the 
Legislative Assembly of Alberta (Hansard) by government MLAs about farm-worker 
safety between 2000 and 2010. Such data is appropriate for content analysis because it is 
intended to communicate a message (White and Marsh 2005). This study excludes 
government policy documents on farm safety. Examples of these documents were 
reviewed and not found to articulate a policy rationale suitable for analysis. This study 
also excludes statements by MLAs recorded in print media. A review of such statements 
revealed they added little new content.  
Data collection began with key word searches (farm, agriculture, safety, injury, 
injured, worker) of Hansard transcripts indices from 2000 to 2010 (inclusive). This 
yielded 127 potentially relevant passages that subsequent review narrowed to 61 passages 
containing a statement by a government MLA about farm worker safety. A coding 
scheme was developed based upon seven explanations for the exclusion evident in the 
dataset. All passages were thematically coded and sorted by explanation. Synthesizing 
each category’s passages into a coherent narrative resulted in the elimination of one 
category due to insufficient evidence. Commonalities within the six remaining categories 
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resulted in these categories being collapsed into the three narratives that are set out 
below. 
The key weakness of conventional content analyses is that an inadequate 
understanding of the phenomenon can exclude important categories and thus distort the 
results (Hsieh and Shannon 2005). Several strategies based on Guba (1981) and Guba and 
Lincoln (1994) were used to ensure the trustworthiness of this study, including providing 
a thick description of findings with numerous exemplars has been presented and having a 
draft reviewed by two knowledgeable practitioners. As per Melrose (2009), the 
applicability of the results to other jurisdictions is left for readers to decide based upon 
context and the documentation set out in the narratives.  
 
Narratives Justifying The Agricultural Exclusion 
 
Between 2000 and 2010, government MLAs used three narratives to justify the 
exclusion of agricultural workers from OHS legislation: 
 
1. Education is better than regulation. 
2. Farms cannot be regulated. 
3. Farmers don’t want and can’t afford regulation. 
 
These narratives are set out below. There is some overlap between the narratives. 
 
Narrative 1: Education Is Better Than Regulation 
 
One rationale for maintaining the exclusion of agricultural workers from the 
ambit of the OHS Act centres on the assertion that safety education is preferable to 
regulation. Throughout the period of study, government members highlighted 
Department of Agriculture education programs that identified safety hazards and hazard 
mitigation strategies. Such statements frame the government’s role as a provider of 
information and education rather than as a regulator. As the issue of farm injury became 
more politically charged after 2005, government members began to explicitly link 
education with injury reduction. This statement by then-Minister of Agriculture, Food 
and Rural Development Doug Horner is illustrative: 
 
Mr. Horner: … Mr. Speaker, what we’re doing is an education program. 
We’re trying to make sure that farmers have the right information about 
what is safe practice and what are some of the issues that they should be 
aware of on-farm so that we don’t have this number of fatalities (Alberta 
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2006a).2 
 
In effect, Horner is asserting that making information available will reduce farm 
injuries. This putative relationship bolsters the notion that the state’s role in farm safety 
should be primarily educative. In 2007, then-Premier Ed Stelmach justified the 
government’s “education” position by asserting that regulation had to be exceptionally 
intrusive in order to work.  
 
Mr. Stelmach: … just because we have regulations does not mean that 
somebody is going to follow them. We have many regulations. We have 
many laws. We have laws that say that people should stop at a stop sign, 
and they don’t. So what is he saying? That we put a policeman at every 
intersection in this province to prevent people from not following the rules 
(Alberta 2007a)? 
 
Subsequent statements broadly follow the assertion that that legislation alone 
cannot eliminate workplace or farm injuries or fatalities. Consequently, the state is left to 
emphasize education. Over time, this discourse changes. In 2007, the government’s 
position is that “legislation alone cannot eliminate workplace or farm injuries or 
fatalities”, although presumably legislation might contribute to a reduction in injuries or 
fatalities. By late 2008, the government’s assertions are more categorical: “legislation is 
not the answer”. This categorical denial of the value of legislation is then used to justify 
both the government’s reliance on education and its unwillingness to include farm 
workers under OHS regulations.  
During this change, alternate explanations for why the government will not 
support regulation emerge. Farms are deemed to be unique workplaces and (some) 
farmers are said to be resistant to farm safety legislation (see below). These narratives 
provide further political justification for an education-based intervention. At this point, 
the “education is better than regulation” narrative is fully formed and subsequent 
government statements focus on defending this position in two ways. On the one hand, 
then-Minister of Agriculture and Food George Groenveld implies that regulation would 
not reduce fatalities: 
 
Mr. Groeneveld: … I think he brought up a figure of 220 the other day. I’d 
love to sit down with the hon. member, go through them, and have him 
                                               
2 It is interesting to note that farm workers are invisible in MLAs’ discussion of education. Instead, MLAs 
assume that various actors (owners, family members, workers) all have the same OHS needs and interests. 
More broadly speaking, a reviewer (correctly) noted that this study does not address the views of farm 
workers. These views will be the subject of a planned separate study. 
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show me where legislation would prevent these accidents. He just has to 
stop looking at the headlines, and he has to start getting to the facts 
(Alberta 2009a). 
 
On the other hand, government members such as MLA Robin Campbell suggest 
that rules can work, but only if those subject to them follow them: 
 
Mr. Campbell: … Mr. Speaker, I want to talk to you also about safety 
training and about regulations. Again, I can rely on 30 years of experience. 
You can have all the safety regulations you want in place, you can have all 
the safety equipment you want in place, but if people do not use common 
sense and follow those regulations, they’re absolutely worthless (Alberta 
2009b). 
 
The apparent contradiction between Groeneveld’s assertion that regulation will 
not reduce injuries and Campbell’s (perhaps unconscious) assertion that effective 
regulation can reduce injuries is never unresolved. 
 
Narrative 2: Family Farms Can’t Be Regulated 
 
A second explanation for excluding agricultural workers from OHS legislation 
centres on the assertion that the unique nature of (at least some) farms makes regulation 
unworkable. Beginning in 2006, Horner emphasizes that farms are often mixed-use 
locations (i.e., homes and workplaces) and thus regulation is somehow inappropriate 
and/or difficult. 
  
Mr. Horner: … Farms are unique in that they are work sites, they’re 
homes, and they’re places where families live, work, and play, so they can’t 
be treated the same way as a construction site. … We don’t have any 
official way of tracking whether the incident occurred while the person 
was engaged in a competitive or a recreational aspect or whether it was a 
farm-productivity activity, in other words working on the farm, so we 
don’t always know if the injury or accident occurred when the person 
might have been out horseback riding or actually involved in a rodeo 
(Alberta 2006a). 
 
Horner is correct that some farms are both workplaces and homes and that some 
“farm” injuries are the result of recreational, rather than occupational, activities. That 
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said, not all agricultural work takes place at mixed-use locations and not all mixed-use 
farms and equipment have recreational potential.  
The “farms are also homes” rationale was tested when the government was 
questioned about why (relatively safe) greenhouses, mushroom farms and nurseries 
(which operate on mixed-use properties) were under the ambit of the legislation while 
farms (including relatively dangerous feedlots, which are usually located on single-use 
sites) are excluded.  
 
Mr. Groeneveld: Well, Mr. Speaker, he understands – I’m certain he 
understands because I’ve explained it to him so many times – that farms 
are unique. Farms are where working families live and they play and they 
work. Consequently, we’ve said all along that education and training is 
where we have to go. I still maintain that you can’t legislate common sense 
(Alberta 2008c). 
 
Groeneveld’s inability to explain the discrepancy of regulating relatively safe farms 
and not regulating relatively dangerous ones casts doubt upon the assertion that farms are 
not regulated solely because they are mixed-use properties. A variation on this argument 
is found MLAs’ efforts to distinguish between so-called “family farms” and “corporate 
farms”. Stelmach first brings this up in 2007: 
 
Mr. Stelmach: Mr. Speaker, this matter has come up in the House a 
number of times with respect to protection that farm workers have. There 
are, of course, those working on family farms and those working on 
corporate farms (Alberta 2007a). 
 
The nature of the difference between family farms and corporate farms is unclear. 
Is a family farm a small farm (whatever small means)? Is it also (or alternately) a farm 
staffed by a family and/or operated as a sole proprietorship? Is a corporate farm a large 
farm? Or one that employs waged labour? Or an incorporated operation. This difference 
is never clarified. 
Whatever the actual difference is, this difference appears (in the view of MLAs) to 
meaningfully impact the appropriateness of safety regulation. Subsequent statements 
further confuse matters. For example, in resisting a call to regulate “big industrial farms 
that employ dozens of people”, Groeneveld notes that most corporate or industrial farms 
are family-managed businesses:  
 
Mr. Groeneveld: Mr. Speaker, corporate farms or industrial, whatever the 
hon. member wants to call them, are still managed pretty much by 
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families; in fact, in the feedlot industry pretty much entirely. Safety is a 
personal commitment between employees and employers. They must 
agree to work together to create a safe workplace. Employees, indeed, are 
treated like family. That commitment along with education and training 
makes a huge difference (Alberta 2008d). 
 
In this passage, Groeneveld asserts that, because “(e)mployees… are treated like 
family”, these large, incorporated farms with “dozens of employees” that are “still 
managed pretty much by families” need not be regulated. This statement suggests that all 
of the potential differences between a family farm and a corporate farm are, in fact, not 
differences. According to Groeneveld, corporate or industrial farms are also family farms, 
regardless of their size, number of employees or legal constitution.  
In subsequent questioning, government members altered the basis of the “family 
farm” exclusion. Then-Minister of Employment and Immigration Thomas Lukaszuk 
emphasized the “unique” nature of the agricultural labour force: 
 
Mr. Lukaszuk: … A farming environment is not your regular, standard 
industrialized environment. You have family members working. You have 
relatives working. You have neighbours helping neighbours. It is not the 
standard work environment, so we will be seeking advice from our 
farming community to tell us what type of assistance they can receive from 
the Alberta government to make sure that they stay as safe as humanly 
possible (Alberta 2010a). 
 
This statement asserts regulating a workforce comprising immediate and 
extended family members and neighbors is inappropriate. Yet, such circumstances exist 
in many industries subject to Alberta OHS regulation (e.g., restaurants, residential 
construction, convenience stores) including some forms of regulated agricultural 
operations (i.e., mushroom farms, greenhouses and nurseries). Furthermore, other 
jurisdictions (e.g., Australia) successfully regulate farms, some of which have similar 
labour force characteristics. 
Interestingly, only 18 months earlier, Lukaszuk had voted against an opposition 
motion to introduce amendments to the Occupational Health and Safety Act to protect 
paid farm workers while continuing to exempt family members and other unpaid 
labourers. One of the reasons government members gave for not supporting this 
amendment was because it differentiated workers based upon their family and 
employment status (Alberta 2009c). 
 
Narrative 3: Farmers Don’t Want And Can’t Afford Regulation 
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Resistance within the agricultural community to the expected cost of safety 
regulation is the third narrative government MLAs employ to justify maintaining the 
agricultural exclusion from the Occupational Health and Safety Act. This narrative is 
sometimes discussed in terms of the economic importance of agriculture, the cost of 
regulation and the specter of farm bankruptcy. In effect, government members assert the 
government must trade off worker safety to maintain the profitability of farms.  
This “farmers can’t afford regulation” portion of this narrative appears three years 
after a 2003 diagnosis of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE or “mad cow” disease) 
created significant hardship among cattle producers in Alberta. Consequently, MLAs 
such as then-Minister of Human Resources and Employment Mike Cardinal were 
reluctant to impose additional regulations: 
 
Mr. Cardinal: …, agriculture continues to face many challenges due to the 
fact that we have to export most of our agricultural products. Therefore, 
when it comes to agriculture, agriculture cannot afford at this time, 
because of the status there, to have too many standards imposed on it 
(Alberta 2006b). 
 
Indeed, in 2006, Cardinal rejected a recommendation to include farm workers 
under the ambit of the OHS Act from a provincial committee reviewing OHS. His 
rationale was that the committee did not include representatives of the agricultural 
community. 
 
Mr. Cardinal: … if it’s going to impact the farm family in particular, we 
would have to consult the farm families out there and the farm industry to 
ensure that whatever is put in place does not impact the farm family 
negatively because the farm families right now, as you know, are 
challenged. There are a lot of bankruptcies out there. A lot of farm families 
are close to bankruptcy right now (Alberta 2006c). 
 
Explicit use of “farmers can’t afford regulation” fell into disuse after 2006, perhaps 
reflecting a reduction in economic pressure on farms as restrictions on beef exports were 
relaxed. Yet the putative threat that safety regulations pose to farms remained a reason to 
reject regulation until the end of the period under study. For example, in 2008, Lukaszuk 
indicated:  
 
Mr. Lukaszuk: … the Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development and 
I are looking at the (Barley) report, and we will make recommendations 
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that achieve two things: keep our farmers safe but also keep them in 
business because the only way to make sure that a farmer doesn’t get hurt 
is just to put him out of business, and we are not willing to do that 
(Alberta 2010b). 
 
In this passage, we see Lukaszuk asserting a trade off between safety and economic 
viability of the farm and, therefore, alternatives to regulation are necessary. In this way, 
this narrative is linked to the “education is better than regulation” narrative.  
Government members have also emphasized the “farmers don’t want regulation” 
portion of this narrative. For example, then-Deputy Premier Shirley McClellan (herself a 
farmer and former Minister of Agriculture) indicated agricultural producers (i.e., 
farmers) direct government policy on regulation: 
 
Mrs. McClellan: … I know that if the producers, in their wisdom not ours, 
were to come forward in a majority view to the minister of agriculture, he 
would bring that forward to this table. He represents them extraordinarily 
well. But I must inform the hon. member, being a part of the agricultural 
community myself, that they are very independent thinkers, and they like 
to make their decisions and ask us to carry out policy they believe is in 
their best interest (Alberta 2006d). 
 
Towards the end of the period under study, the role of the agricultural industry in 
this narrative has slightly changed. Rather than the agricultural industry being given an 
effective veto over safety regulation, government members began positing the agricultural 
industry should shape any regulation.  
 
Mr. Lukaszuk: … The hon. Member for Edmonton-Riverview will know 
that the Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development has undertaken 
an initiative where he will be drawing advice from those they’re actually 
seeking to protect, from farmers, to advise us what is the best kind of 
coverage that would work for them, whether education would satisfy them 
(Alberta 2010a). 
 
Again, we see the use of farmers with all agricultural workers, who may have quite 
different interests than their employers do. To date, such consultations have not resulted 
in significant change in the government’s original position (farmers don’t want and can’t 
afford regulation) thus this slight change in emphasis does not fundamentally alter the 
basic narrative. 
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Testing The Narratives 
 
“Education Is Preferable To Regulation” 
 
Government MLAs make two assertions when discussing the “education is 
preferable to regulation” narrative: (1) education is more effective than regulation at 
reducing injuries and fatalities on farms, and (2) legislation is not effective at reducing 
injuries and fatalities on farms. Analysis suggests these assertions are invalid. 
No studies directly compare the relative efficacy of education and legislation at 
reducing agricultural injuries. That said, Hagel et al. (2008) found an education-based 
farm-safety program in Saskatchewan was not associated with observable improvements 
in farm safety practices, hazards or injury outcomes. A 2003 evaluation of the Canadian 
Agricultural Safety Program was also unable to substantiate any impact upon fatality of 
injury rates (Canada 2003). These findings were mirrored in studies of farmers in 
Colorado and Iowa as well as a national US youth education program (Beseler and 
Stallones 2010; Rautlainen et al. 2004; Lee, Westaby and Berg 2004).  
The broader literature on the effectiveness of education is mixed. Some studies 
have found positive associations between training and injury reductions (Burke et al. 
2005; Waehrer and Miller 2009). Other studies suggest education alone is not effective at 
reducing injury rates in health care (Tullar et al. 2010; D’Arcy et al. 2011) or logging (Bell 
and Grushecky 2006) while others report small reductions in construction worker injuries 
(Kinn et al. 2000; Xuiwen et al. 2004). Overall, there is no evidence that education is more 
effective than legislation at reducing injuries and weak support that educational programs 
reduce occupational injuries, with no evidence of this in agriculture.  
A practical approach to assessing the impact of educational programs on injury 
reduction is to examine agricultural injuries in Alberta over time. Unfortunately, Alberta 
does not collect comprehensive data. What data there is shows little change in farm injury 
rates between 1997 and 2006 followed by a sharp decline from 2006 to 2009 (Alberta, 
2011).3 The reliability of this data and the cause of the apparent decline is unclear.  
No studies examining the efficacy of OHS legislation at reducing farm injuries 
were uncovered. Marlenga et al. (2007) suggest that subjecting US family farms to 
regulation and increasing age restrictions would address most serious injuries 
experienced by young family farm workers. That said, examinations of OHS compliance 
on Australian and Irish farms suggests that being subject to legislation does not 
                                               
3 These statistics should be viewed with caution due to the voluntary and partial nature of the data as well as 
the absence of controls for changes in the farming population (e.g., the concentration of the livestock 
industry). The relationship between these stats and farm safety education is unclear as no comprehensive 
explanation of educational programs or changes exist. Interestingly, the virtual elimination of farm safety 
education in Alberta during the late 1990s was not associated with any change in these injury rates.  
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necessarily result in compliance: enforcement is required (Lower, Fragar and Temperley 
2011; Finnegan 2007). This accords with the broader literature on OHS legislation 
(Tompa, Treithick and McLeod 2007). Assuming enforcement occurs, there is a wide 
body of literature demonstrating it possible to “legislate common sense” and that such 
regulation is effective and reduces injuries, including mandatory bicycle helmet 
(Macpherson, 2002) and child car seat use (Farmer et al. 2009), and prohibitions on 
firearms (Ozanne-Smith et al. 2004; Kapusta et al. 2007), domestic violence (Dugan 
2006), and impaired driving (Asbridge et al. 2004; Mann et al. 2001). 
Adequately enforced legislation does appear to reduce injury. Indeed, for this 
reason, the government of Alberta has enacted OHS legislation in all other industries. 
There is no evidence that this dynamic does not operate in agriculture. In fact, the 
government has subjected portions of the agricultural industry to OHS legislation. 
Advocating a demonstrably ineffective “education-only” approach to reducing 
agricultural injuries calls into question the validity of the government’s assertion that 
“any time we have a farm fatality or a farm accident, it’s one time too many. Our goal is to 
have zero” (Alberta 2008e). 
 
“Farms Cannot Be Regulated” 
 
Government MLAs make three assertions with respect to regulation when 
advancing the “farms cannot be regulated” narrative: (1) there is a meaningful difference 
between “family” and “corporate” farms, (2) the presence of family members and 
neighbours on the farm prevents regulation, and (3) agricultural operations on mixed-use 
locations cannot be regulated. Analysis suggests these assertions are invalid. 
While government MLA often referred to a putative difference between family 
farms and corporate farms to explain why regulation is not possible or is difficult, they 
were unable to establish any criterion upon which family farms could be consistently 
differentiated from corporate farms.4 In other instances, MLAs frequently discussed 
farms in monolithic terms (e.g., “they’re places where families live, work and play”) in 
order to explain why regulation was difficult. This repeated inconsistency (farms are 
different vs. farms are the same) suggests that positing a difference between family and 
                                               
4 Data about Alberta’s agricultural industry that bears upon this prevalence of different types of farms is 
very difficult to find. In 2006, Alberta had 49,431 farms, a 7.9% decline from 2001, with farm size increasing 
by 8.8%. This continues a long-term trend dating back to at least 1961 (Alberta, 2010d). Of these farms, 
13.6% were run as family corporations and 1.4% as non-family corporations comprise. The remainder were 
sole proprietorships or other farm types (e.g., community pastures or institutional farms). Approximately 
$537.1 million in wages and salary payments were reported in 2006. Growth in farm size is largely 
concentrated in farms over 1600 acres. Growth in farm receipts is almost exclusively in farms with gross 
income of over $500,000. Taken together, these changes suggest an increasing numbers of large-scale, 
capital-intensive farms.  
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corporate farms is a rhetorical device designed to sidetrack debate, rather than being a 
real impediment to regulation.  
The assertion that the presence of family members and neighbours on farms 
precludes any regulation is difficult to believe given that every other Canadian 
jurisdiction as well as other countries (e.g., Australia) regulates farm work. These 
jurisdictions use several techniques to distinguish family members and neighbours from 
other workers (although why family members and neighbours do not warrant similar 
protections is not clear). Ontario, for example, regulates only paid workers (Ontario 
2011). While some farms in other jurisdictions may be significantly smaller in area and 
larger in workforce than an Alberta farm, there is no evidence or logical reason that 
Alberta’s farms are so unique that regulatory approaches from others jurisdictions are 
completely inapplicable (Veeman and Veeman 2011). 
Alberta government MLAs objected to the regulation of only paid farm workers in 
2009. The basis of their opposition was the assertion that all workers must have the same 
rights. Such blanket treatment runs contrary to other Alberta employment legislation 
which provides different statutory rights to different worker groups. Further, the 
paradoxical effect of refusing to distinguish among groups of farm workers (in order not 
to deprive any group of their rights) is that all farm workers are deprived of statutory 
safety rights because, in 2010, the government claimed that it can’t regulate family 
members and neighbours in the same way as workers. 
The assertion that it is not possible to regulate mixed-use farms is not 
substantiated. Indeed, Alberta does regulate some mixed-used agricultural operations 
(e.g., greenhouses, nurseries, and sod and mushroom farms) and other jurisdictions 
regulate all farms. Further, the degree to which Alberta farms are mixed-use sites is 
unclear.5 
 
“Farmers Don’t Want And Can’t Afford Regulation” 
 
Government MLAs assert (1) farmers can’t afford regulation, and (2) farmers 
don’t want regulation. The cost of compliance with the Occupational Health and Safety 
                                               
5 As noted above, there is no reliable source of disaggregated data that clearly indicates the number of 
industrial-style farms, where the “mixed use” argument might be clearly inapplicable. One former 
agriculture bureaucrat suggests characterizing the agriculture in monolithic terms (“49,000 farmers”) is an 
intentional government strategy to avoid regulating industrial-style operations.  
Anecdotal evidence of large-scale, industrial-style operations exists. Consider Highland Feeders, a family 
grain farm incorporated in 1976 east of Edmonton. In 1983, Highland began expanding its cattle operation 
from 50 head to 36,000 with annual revenue of $60 million (Highland Feeder, 2011). Such large-scale 
operations are increasingly common in livestock. Similarly, grain operations have seen significant 
consolidation. 
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Act is unknown and will vary between farms. The absence of a definitive cost analysis of 
safety regulations in farming raises questions about the veracity of the claim that 
“…agriculture cannot afford (safety regulations) at this time…” (Alberta 2006d). It 
should be noted that farmers in other jurisdictions appear able to bear this cost.  
One implication of accepting the assertion that regulation is cost-prohibitive is 
that we also accept its underlying premise: the state should permit businesses that cannot 
afford to comply with safety standards to avoid them and, thereby, facilitate the transfer 
of production costs (in the form of workplace injuries) onto workers, their family and 
society. Enabling farmers to externalize costs via an exemption seems inconsistent with 
the injury-prevention purpose of OHS legislation. It is also inconsistent with the 
government’s stated goal of having no agricultural fatalities or injuries (Alberta 2008e). 
The notion that workers ought to subsidize business costs is not unique to farm 
safety. In March 2010, then-Minister Lukaszuk froze a planned minimum wage increase 
affecting 1.5% of the workforce. “This decision reflects what government feels will both 
protect jobs during these uncertain economic times and support the economy” (Alberta 
2010c, 1). Making low-wage workers absorb inflation-related living costs to protect a few 
businesses from a $240 per worker annual cost increase seems inconsistent with the 
purpose of minimum-wage legislation.  
The main effect of the “farmers can’t afford regulation” narrative is that it 
displaces concern about worker safety with concern about farm profitability. In this way, 
the desire of agricultural producers (i.e., “farmers don’t want regulation”) is transformed 
from a bald statement of self-interest into an unverifiable (but plausible) rationale (“they 
can’t afford it”) for maintaining the agricultural exclusion. Similarly, casting agricultural 
producers in the role of deciding whether and what kind of regulation is necessary is 
premised on the notion that the profitability of farms is the paramount policy concern.6 
Overall, this analysis suggested that the “farms don’t want and can’t afford regulation” is a 
policy preference rather than a factual statement.  
 
Discussion 
 
The narratives MLAs use to justify the regulatory exclusion of farm workers from 
OHS legislation lack validity. The question this raises is: why does the government 
continue to resist pressure to extend OHS coverage to farm workers? One explanation is 
that some government MLAs may believe these narratives are valid, despite the flaws 
                                               
6 It is useful to note concern about farm profitability does not appear to be an impediment in other forms of 
regulation, such as guidelines about chemical application, handling and disposal, animal health regulations, 
food safety regulations, water pollution, hazardous waste disposal and the decommissioning of land and 
surface reclamation of oil and gas sites on farm property.  
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present in them.7 A second explanation is that some government MLAs don’t believe 
these narratives, but find them rhetorically useful in resisting pressure to regulate farm 
safety. Resistance to regulating agriculture may be motivated by a belief that regulation 
does not improve injury outcomes and/or an ideological commitment to minimizing 
regulation. It may also be motivated by the electoral rewards that may be attached to 
advancing these narratives.  
Farmers and other residents of rural communities are threatened by the specter of 
population loss due to urbanization. Mitigating the effect of this loss depends upon the 
continued presence of government-operated services (e.g., hospitals, schools and senior 
homes) as well as retaining agricultural operations (Alberta 2004b). Alberta’s government 
has provided significant support to rural communities (Alberta 2009d), including 
attracting medical personnel (Alberta 2011b), increasing post-secondary access (Alberta, 
n.d.), providing broadband internet (Alberta 2011c), providing informational and 
financial support to rural businesses (Alberta 2011d), and providing hundreds of millions 
of funding to farmers affected by BSE and other cost pressures (Roy, Klein and Klvacek 
2006; Urban Renaissance Institute 2002). 
Rural constituencies almost always elect Progressive Conservative candidates to 
the legislature (Alberta 1997, 2001b, 2004a, 2008a). And Conservative governments have 
ensured electoral boundaries are drawn so there are a disproportionately high number of 
rural ridings (Archer 1993; Thomson 2008). Opposing additional regulation is consistent 
with a symbiotic relationship between Conservative MLAs and rural voters. Some 
indirect support for this conclusion is evident in third narrative: that an employer does 
not desire to be subject to OHS regulation is hardly surprising but that farmers are able to 
actualize this desire is unusual. This suggests they are utilizing some lever to maintain 
their preferred status in the face of regulatory pressure on MLAs. 
These narratives provide politicians with some protection from criticism that they 
are enabling employers to expose workers to hazards that other workers do not face. 
These narratives also legitimize employer decisions to trade workers’ health for profit. 
Pairing the assertion that farmers can’t afford regulation with the assertion that education 
provides adequate protection erects a rhetorical shield for employers against public wrath 
over the issue. In this way, the government is legitimizing employer behaviour that might 
otherwise be considered unacceptable by the public. These findings are important for two 
reasons. First, they are one of the first efforts to analyze and contextualize how 
government MLAs justified a controversial policy. Second, they unpack aspects of the 
state’s role in a capitalist economy to legitimate harmful modes of production.  
It is unclear whether granting farm workers basic safety rights will make any 
significant difference in their safety at work. Alberta regulators note that the low 
probability of inspection means farm operators who are within the ambit of the OHS Act 
                                               
7 Informal discussion with bureaucrats suggests the narratives’ flaws are well known. 
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are not highly motivated to comply (Aitkin 2012), a pervasive issue throughout Alberta’s 
OHS system (Barnetson, 2012b). As identified by Bernstein et al. (2006), the precarious 
nature of farm work may well create barriers (e.g., limited job security and fear of 
employer retribution) that prevent workers from exercising any rights they gain via 
statutory inclusion. Even Canadian workers with secure employment have difficulty 
refusing unsafe work (Gray 2002; Fidler 1985). Further, there is some evidence that 
Canadian governments are using worker safety rights as a way to transfer responsibility 
for workplace safety from employers to workers (Gray 2006a, 2006b, 2009). Blaming 
workers is evident in Alberta’s OHS prevention materials (Barnetson and Foster, 2012). 
That said, including farm workers within the ambit of OHS legislation is still 
useful. Possessing rights is a necessary precondition to exercising them. While the 
number of farm workers who will exercise them alone is likely to be small, possessing 
such rights gives worker organizations a place on which to hinge demands for compliance 
and enforcement. That is to say, rather than fighting for recognition of farm worker safety 
rights, such campaigns can focus on enforcing farm worker safety rights. To the degree 
that there is political will to do so, including farm workers within the ambit of the OHS 
Act also allows the government to inspect farms and penalize employers who violate the 
rules (although realistically, Alberta inspects fewer than 1 in 14 workplaces a year and 
only sanctions employers in a small minority of cases of serious injury or worker death). 
That said, inspection of only industrialized agricultural worksites (e.g., feedlots) would be 
a huge improvement. There is also a normative dimension to granting farm workers 
safety rights. Farmers may feel moral and/or reputational pressure (especially over time) 
to meaningfully consider and accommodate farm worker safety. Those who don’t comply 
can then be subjected to political tactics, such as boycotts or public shaming. This may 
increase the effectiveness of Alberta’s emphasis on safety education.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this study was to ascertain how government MLAs justified 
maintaining the regulatory exclusion of agricultural workers from the ambit of Alberta’s 
OHS legislation and to examine the validity of the rationale(s) used. Content analysis of 
legislative debates generated three invalid narratives that are used to justify the exclusion. 
The question this raises is: why do MLAs support maintaining the regulatory exclusion? 
One explanation is that MLAs may not accept that these narratives are invalid. An 
alternate (or complimentary) explanation is that these narratives have utility in 
maintaining the exclusion and thereby realize electoral rewards. That is to say, the 
Conservative Party may have developed a symbiotic relationship with rural voters and felt 
compelled to refrain from regulating agricultural employment. More bluntly, the political 
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risk associated with regulating farm safety may be seen as higher than the political risk 
associated with farm worker injury and death. 
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